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Manipulation with Big Data Analytics allows commercial exploitation of individuals based on unfair
commercial practices. Consequently, the concepts of consumer protection are essential in the
data-driven economy and a central issue for effective safety for individuals in the Big Data Age.
Although the fields of consumer protection and data protection in the European Union (EU) have
developed separately, there is an unambiguous relationship between them. While the GDPR plays
a crucial role in an individual’s data protection in a case of personal data processing, Directive
2005/29/EC (UCPD) plays an essential role in regulating an individual’s protection from the unfair
commercial practice when it comes to personal data processing. A vital aspect of the UCPD is the
enforcement of issues related to consumer privacy. However, a much-debated question is whether
the UCPD is fully effective or not when it comes to personal data processing. This paper examines
case law examples on WhatsApp and Facebook in Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. This
paper also aims to come to a conclusion on the issue of the applicability of the rules on unfair
commercial practice when it comes to data processing.
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1. Introduction
Individuals are providing a lot of personal data through their active participation in social net-
works, posts on blogs and email communication. Consequently, personal data plays an essential
role in the information society.
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Maja Nišević, University of Verona Department of Law, Via S. Francesco, 22 Verona, 37129 Italy.
E-mail: maja.nisevic@univr.it
Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law
2021, Vol. 28(1) 7–29






Development of Big Data Analytics offered substantial economic and commercial benefits to
the private and public domain. Collecting and processing data through Big Data Analytics is often
called the gold oil of the 21st century. Big Data Analytics, as an emerging technology, changed
how data is collected, analysed and applied. Besides, data manipulation through Big Data Analy-
tics has become essential for running today’s businesses. However, Big Data Analytics includes
novel, complex and sometimes unexpected non-transparent uses of personal data. The open ques-
tion is whether Big Data Analytics could be considered personal even in a case of anonymization of
personal data. There are two fundamental reasons for this question. Firstly, Big Data Analytics
interferes with the privacy of individuals. Secondly, Big Data Analytics often leads to an imbal-
ance between the data subject and data controllers.
Since the primary concern of personal data processing is either data collection or data manip-
ulation intending to produce new information about individuals, it is not surprising that personal
data processing is mainly used for commercial purposes. Besides, the use of Big Data Analytics
has become a successful tool to create individual profiles that can be used for commercial and
other purposes. Considering all the advantages of the collection and processing of personal data
through Big Data Analytics, traders can very quickly obtain information about an individual’s
preferences or expected behaviour. Information about individuals can be communicated openly
to the user (for example, recommendations for a specific music show or restaurant) or merely
assumed by the user (for example, an advertisement that is not related to a past search) or can be
hidden entirely (for example, data being assembled and sold by data brokers, such as Acxiom, or
by other third parties, as was the case in the Cambridge Analytica scandal).1 It is necessary to
clarify that the consumer data are often processed to a third party, whose business is adding value
with Big Data Analytics. In that regard, difficulties for consumer protection arise when an
attempt is made to implement commercial exploitation of the consumer based on unfair com-
mercial practices.
Without any doubt, the data-driven economy opens specific issues that have come up
concerning transparency, payment with data and the moving meaning of the consumer bench-
mark. Although the development of the data economy does not raise the different legal
doctrinal structures at a fundamental level, it does raise questions as to how existing doctrines
can respond to the emergence of data-driven technologies. Current regulation may provide
adequate answers to the question of which rights consumers can enforce against traders.
However, modern consumer protection law requires a cornerstone. The GDPR,2 as the main
legislation on data protection in the European Union (EU) concerning the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights,3 sets out the rules regarding data processing.4 Looking at the EU Court
of Justice (CJEU) case law, data processing includes the collecting, retrieving, recording,
organization, storage and disclosing or making available of the data to third parties.5
1. See M. Büchi et al., ‘The Chilling Effects of Algorithmic Profiling: Mapping the Issues’, 36 Computer Law & Security
Review (2019).
2. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119.
3. Article 8 of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
4. Article 4(1)(2) GDPR.
5. See European Commission, What constitutes data processing? https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/
reform/what-constitutes-data-processing_en.
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Generally said, data processing contains six stages: data collection, data preparation, data
input, data processing, data output and data storage.6
Since Big Data Analytics is often used for running a business, it imposed a causal relationship
between consumer protection law and data protection law in the EU. In that regard, while the
GDPR plays a crucial role in an individual’s data protection, Directive 2005/29/EC (the UCPD)7
plays a vital role in regulating an individual’s protection from unfair commercial practice when it
comes to personal data processing. From one side, the GDPR may have contributed to the increase
in impacts on unfair commercial practices, concerning unfair means of communicating with
consumers. On the other side, the UCPD offers protection when it comes to unfair commercial
practices in business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. Besides, traders who engage in unfairly
influencing consumers by aggressive or misleading practices may distort consumers’ economic
choice-making. Responding to these practices, the UCPD aims to strengthen the consumer’s
choice and the fair operation of B2C markets. That is why the UCPD may have been an essential
factor in the enforcement of consumer privacy issues considering the consumer’s final decision.
In recent years there has been an interest from various national enforcement bodies in remedy-
ing commercial behaviour exploiting the increasing information and power between consumers
and analytics companies. For this paper the examples of the Italian authority, the German author-
ities and the UK authority are researched. This paper then aims to analyse how national bodies are
applied to different rules when it comes to personal data processing. For the research presented in
this paper, the main focus is on WhatsApp and Facebook. This paper is divided into several
sections. Section 2 is about the legal enforcement of the UCPD, including the interpretation of
the online platform and consumer. Considering WhatsApp and Facebook cases in Italy, Germany
and the UK, section 3, with its subsection, provides a broad overview of the rulings. Finally,
section 4 provides a conclusion.
2. Legal enforcement of the UCPD in EU
The main aim of the UCPD lies in the prohibition of unfair commercial practices that are contrary
to the requirements of professional diligence.8 Besides, the UCPD consists of specific prohibitions
of misleading action and omission and aggressive practices.9 Finally, the UCPD consists of the last
level of the prohibition set out in its Annex 1 (blacklist), which contains a list of unfair practices in
any circumstance.10
However, the UCPD only sets the detailed framework for how the Member States may regulate
commercial practice. Considering the UCPD’s Article 11, Member States ‘shall ensure adequate
and effective means exist to combat unfair commercial practices’ and that persons or organizations
should be able to contest such practices by taking legal action and bringing the case before
6. See Case C-131/12 Google Spain and Google, EU:C:2014:317, para. 50.
7. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-consumer
commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC,
98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of
the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (Text with EEA rele-
vance)[2005] OJ L 149/22 .
8. Article 5 UCPD.
9. Article 6-7 and 8-9 UCPD.
10. Annex 1 of the UCPD.
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administrative authorities. Consequently, the Member States had the power to decide which
sanction is applicable in the case of violation. Article 13 stated that the Member States are
obligated to lay down penalties for infringement of national provisions adopted in application
of the UCPD and that these penalties shall be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. In addition,
Article 16 UCPD set out the deadline for the UCPD adoption by the Member State.
Although there must be identical conditions within the system of enforcement among national
legislation to achieve the UCPD’s objectives, several types of effect resulted after the UCPD was
transposed into the national systems. Firstly, there are different examples of the UCPD implemen-
tation inside of the EU. Secondly, there are differences in how the Member States assess key
concepts used in determining whether a commercial practice is unfair. Thirdly, there are differences
in the interpretation of the image of consumers protected by national laws. Since the interpretation of
the image of consumers varies among national systems inside of the EU, it is essential to clarify that
there are Member States with strong consumer protection elements and Member States with strong
controls on competition by competitors. Fourthly, there are differences in referring to the duties of
the trader in commercial practices and especially in misleading advertising. All in all, the objective of
maximum harmonization seems very difficult to reach when the general clause in Article 3 UCPD is
constituted so that notions are open to national interpretation. Consequently, the enforcement of
unfair commercial practices seems mostly unharmonized within the EU.
A possible explanation for all this might be that the Member States have introduced a different
strategy for enforcing the rules, choosing between public and private enforcement. Concerning the
history and the culture of the law governing unfair commercial practices, the UCPD implemen-
tation within the Member States has been carried out with different technical choices. Besides,
some of the Member States already had legislation on unfair practices and others did not.
A. The UCPD and online platform
The UCPD does not define an online platform. However, Guidance on the UCPD11 recognizes the
online platform as a business model emerging in the digital economy.
The business model often referred to as an online platform may be a social media platform,
online app store, search engine, e-commerce platform, user comparison review tools, collaborative
economy platform, collective buying platform, etc.
One of the emerging services in the digital economy is internet-based communication services
(OTT services – for example, voice over IP provided by WhatsApp).12 The services mentioned are
not still adequately regulated under the EU. Consequently, users face a very high risk of operator
misconduct, and it creates a new challenge for the consumer protection agenda inside the EU.
The OECD report described the online platform as a range of services available on the Internet,
including marketplaces, search engines, social media, creative content outlets, app stores, com-
munications services, payment systems, services comprising the so-called ‘collaborative’ or ‘gig’
economy, and much more.13 Generally speaking, an online platform is a digital service that merely
makes interactions between two or more Internet users.
11. Guidance on the application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/
consumers/unfair-commercial-practices-law/unfair-commercial-practices-directive_en.
12. Ibid.
13. See OECD, ‘What is an ‘‘Online Platform’’?’, in OECD, An Introduction to Online Platforms and Their Role in the
Digital Transformation (OECD Publishing, 2019), p. 19–26.
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Since consumers play an essential role on the Internet, online platforms have become key
market players, which are covering any service or application delivered over the Internet to
consumers. Further, the EU digital market and digital platforms are essential factors for the EU’s
minimal digital borders. For this reason, digital platforms typically offer their services seamlessly
across the entire EU. Without a doubt, digital platforms are bringing different benefits. Firstly, they
are making consumers’ lives more comfortable. Secondly, digital platforms are providing possi-
bilities for consumers to enjoy the digital revolution.
However, the growth of digital platforms leads to different legal challenges. Data-driven tech-
nologies can learn about consumer preferences and tailor production and advertising to these
preferences. Besides, very little of what happens with the data is clear and transparent to con-
sumers. Lack of transparency and adequate information for consumers prevent consumers from
assessing the real value of the service they are getting, as well as the underlying contractual
relationship and economic trade-off that is taking place.14
B. Type of transactions covered by the UCPD
The UCPD has a comprehensive scope of application, and it is technology-neutral.15 It covers all
B2C transactions. The UCPD contains a three-tier division. Firstly, it prohibits generally unfair
practices. Secondly, it prevents explicitly misleading (action and omission) and aggressive prac-
tices. Thirdly, the UCPD includes blacklisted practices in its Annex 1.
For a practice to be covered by the UCPD it must be commercial by nature (that is, it
must originate from a trader). It must be directly connected with the promotion, sale or
supply of trader’s products to consumers. Further, the UCPD’s rules that are applicable
B2C transaction means practices performed before, during and after a commercial trans-
action. For this reason, as it is defined in Article 2(1)(d) UCPD, commercial practice must
be ‘any act, omission, course, of conduct or representation, commercial communication
including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion,
sale or supply of product to consumers’. Consequently, UCPD is suitable for either offline
or online B2C transactions.
The first step in evaluating the UCPD applicability to online B2C transactions contains the
evaluation of whether the online provider is qualified as a trader under Article 2(1)(b) UCPD.
Considering Article 2(1)(b) UCPD, a trader is any natural or legal person who is acting for
purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession and anyone acting in the name of or
on behalf of the trader. Here it is clear that Article 2(1)(b) UCPD covers not only traders who act on
their account but also persons, including consumers, acting in the name of or on behalf of another
trader. There is a strong possibility a that commercial transaction is assumed to be a B2C trans-
action, even though it exists between consumers. What follows from this type of transaction is the
hidden B2C transaction. A hidden B2C transaction considers consumers who either act as a trader
or act on behalf of traders, and are selling a product to other consumers. Considering the case law in
the EU, the decision as to whether a seller qualifies as a trader or consumer varies from case to
case. Still, the main criteria should be the presence of profit through commercial activities directed
14. See: BEUC, Ensuring Consumer Protection in the Platform Economy, Position paper, p. 7–12.
15. Article 3 of the UCPD.
Nišević 11
towards consumers. Moreover, the national provision transposing the UCPD will determine who
could be considered a trader.16
The second step in evaluating the UCPD applicability to online B2C transactions is the evalua-
tion of whether the online provider is involved in B2C practices as stated in Article 2(1)(d) UCPD.
Concerning these evaluation steps, an online platform qualified as a trader must act following
Articles 6 and 7 UCPD.17 Consequently, traders must avoid any misleading actions and omissions
whenever engaging in the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers. In line with Article
6, a misleading action exists if it contains either false information and is untruthful or is likely to
mislead the average consumer aiming to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken
otherwise. In line with Article 7 UCPD, a commercial practice is misleading if it omits material
information, and the average consumer needs to make an informed transactional decision. In the
end, a commercial practice will always be unfair if it materially distorts or is likely to materially
distort the average consumer’s economic behaviour or the average member of the group.18
3. The UCPD and consumers
The protection system in the UCPD offers a consumer the right to information.19 This strong
emphasis on the provision of information and transparency as being a good thing and an effective
means of the consumer protecting himself came throughout the development of EU unfair com-
mercial practices law. The key counterbalance to these transparency and information obligations
was to create a strong consumer image, based on which picture consumers could be judged. In that
regard, the UCPD Articles 5, 6 and 7 offer protection to the average consumer. The average
consumer is not just the main objective for protection but also the main benchmark on which the
assessment of the fairness of a trader’s commercial practice is based. The case law of the CJEU
firstly developed this notion of the average consumer.20 Concerning the definition of the average
16. For instance, in a decision of 19 December 2014, the Italian Consumer and Competition Authority decided that an
online travel intermediary was a ‘trader’ in relation to certain claims it had provided on its Italian website. The
company’s role was not limited to storing information on its platform, but it involved the activity of classification and
systematization of information related to hotel facilities, restaurants and tourist attractions. In particular, the company
provided a comparison service of tourist facilities. See: Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive
2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices, SWD(2016) 163 final, para. 5.5.2., p. 119.
17. Article 6 of the UCPD, ‘Misleading action’ and Article 7 of the UCPD, ‘Misleading omission’.
18. Article 5(2)(b) of the UCPD.
19. Article 7 of the UCPD.
20. The genesis of the CJEU rules based on the average consumer can be identified in the judgment of the Court of 16 July
1998. Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide GmbH and Rudolf Tusky v. Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt – Amt für
Lebensmittelüberwachung, EU:C:1998:369. Gut Springenheide sold packed eggs with the indication ‘6-grain-10 fresh
eggs’ due to the fact that the food that was used for the animals was composed of 60% of a variety of different cereals.
The court stated that for determining if a statement can be considered as misleading, the national courts should evaluate
on the basis of the average consumer who is ‘reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’.
This means that the consumer that is less averagely informed, observant and circumspect is not protected from the
distortion of their economic behaviour. This practice of the court was repeated in Case C-220/98 Estée Lauder Cos-
metics GmbH v. Lancaster Group GmbH, EU:C:2000:8, para. 30: ‘Although, at first sight, the average consumer –
reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect – ought not to expect a cream whose name
incorporates the term ‘‘lifting’’ to produce enduring effects, it nevertheless remains for the national court to determine,
in the light of all the relevant factors, whether that is the position in this case.’
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consumer, there is always the presumption that the average consumer is expected to behave as a
critical player in the market.
In sum, the UCPD defines the meaning of the consumer21 by introducing the consumer’s type
covered with the protection (that is, an average consumer) and defining the consumer as a means of
assessment of the commercial practice fairness (that is, the consumer as a benchmark). The UCPD
also introduced the meaning of the vulnerable consumer. Looking at Article 5(3) UCPD, ‘vulner-
able consumer’ is used as a benchmark for assessing the fairness of a commercial practice when it
hinders the economic interests of particularly vulnerable consumers.
A. The UCPD is suitable for an online platform
Considering that personal data is often sold to third parties and de facto has economic value, it is
reasonable to assume that data-driven businesses engaging in B2C transactions should always fall
under the scope of the UCPD. Besides, whenever an online platform can be considered a trader as
regards the UCPD, it is required to act with a degree of professional diligence and not mislead
consumers through action or omission. Further, looking at the online platform’s data processing,
the protection offered against the unauthorized use of consumer’s data is provided by the transpar-
ency requirements set out in the UCPD.22 An example might be a trader who fails to disclose in a
clear, intelligible and timely manner that personal data provided by the consumer are processed
and used for commercial activities of the trader; this would be an unfair omission, defined in
the UCPD.
It is more than clear that transparency requirements defined in the UCPD have a strong overlap
with conditions stipulated in the GDPR (by Articles 13 and 14). Besides, the GDPR requires for
lawfully personal data processing, the existence of the consumer consent or the performance of the
contract, or the legitimate interests. However, data processing for commercial purposes is unlikely
to itself constitute legitimate interest, and the existence of the consent is always doubtful.23
From a practical point of view, consumer consent would mostly be obtained through the
consumer’s acceptance of general terms and conditions, in which data processing is included. For
example, in popular social media platforms, such as Facebook, terms of services clearly state that
personal data will be processed to evaluate some of the user’s preferences.24 Difficulties arise if a
social media platform does not inform users that their data may be processed for commercial
purposes. Further, some evidence suggests that social media as an online platform is often used by
third-party traders to engage directly in unfair commercial practices towards users. For this reason,
21. Article 2(1)(a) of the UCPD.
22. At the first point, Article 6 and Article 7. In addition, it is necessary to mention here Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April
1993 on unfair contract terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29, which protects consumers against unfair
standard contract terms imposed by traders. It applies to all kinds of contracts on the purchase of goods and services, for
instance online or offline purchases of consumer goods, gym subscriptions, or contracts on financial services, such as
loans. For more information, see: EU Commission, Unfair contract terms directive, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-
topic/consumers/consumer-contract-law/unfair-contract-terms-directive_en
23. See V. Mak, ‘Contract and Consumer Law’, in V. Mak and E. Tjong Tjin Tai, Research Handbook in Data Science and
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), p. 17–38.
24. Point 2 ‘How are our services funded: We collect and use your personal data in order to provide the services described
above for you. You can learn about how we collect and use your data in our Data Policy. You have controls over the
types of ads and advertisers you see, and the types of information we use to determine which ads we show you.’
Available at: www.facebook.com/terms.php
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social media platforms, as well as other online platforms, which are considered as the traders under
the UCPD, should take appropriate measures that enable relevant third-party traders to comply
with transparency requirements under the UCPD.
Although online platforms should always provide detailed and accurate information for users
concerning the UCPD, it is not always the case. The EU Commission investigation against merger
activities between Facebook and WhatsApp showed that valuable Big Data caused anti-
competitive market power because the same party controlled either the input or Big Data process-
ing and collection.25 All in all, Facebook engaged directly in unfair commercial practices towards
consumers.
The importance of this investigation is not just that a fine was imposed on Facebook for the first
time by the EU Commission, but also that it resulted in an investigation that has been carried out by
national authorities of Member States.
4. Practical examples of Italy, Germany and the UK
Since the UCPD represents maximum horizontal harmonization in the EU, the UCPD only sets the
specific framework for how the Member States may regulate commercial practice. The strict
application of the UCPD caused Member States to substantially adapt their national legal systems
to comply with the rules of the UCPD. On that ground, there are different examples of the UCPD
implementation inside of the EU. For example, the single statute having common provisions for
competitors, consumers and other market participants against unfair acts could be found in Ger-
many. Unlike Germany, the existing Italian Consumers Code implemented the UCPD rules by
Legislative Decree in the Italian Consumer Code. As far as unfair competition is concerned, Italian
Competition Law plays an important role. By contrast, in the UK, the UCPD was implemented by
the adoption of a new Regulation on Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading (CPR).
A. Example of Italy
Italy was among the first Member States that implemented the UCPD before the deadline.26 The
Italian legislator tried to balance the EU’s ambition to harmonize legislation against unfair com-
mercial practices through the national legal system. Consequently, Italy enacted different decrees,
25. EU Commission competition case No. COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para. 47: ‘the vast majority of social
networking services are provided free of monetary charges. They can however be monetized through other means, such
as advertising or charges for premium services’, and para. 167–190, inter alia para. 167, which states: ‘However, the
Commission has examined whether the transaction could nevertheless have the effect of strengthening Facebook’s
position in the online advertising market, thereby raising serious doubts as to its compatibility with the market. For this
purpose, the Commission has analysed two main possible theories of harm, according to which Facebook could
strengthen its position in online advertising by: (i) introducing advertising on WhatsApp, and/or (ii) using WhatsApp as
a potential source of user data for the purpose of improving the targeting of Facebook’s advertising activities outside
WhatsApp. Each of these two possible theories of harm is examined below’, and para. 168: ‘According to this possible
theory of harm, post-Transaction, the merged entity could introduce targeted advertising on WhatsApp by analysing
user data collected from WhatsApp’s users (and/or from Facebook users who are also WhatsApp users). This would
have the effect of reinforcing Facebook’s position in the online advertising market or sub-segments thereof’, and para.
180: ‘The merged entity could start collecting data from WhatsApp users with a view to improving the accuracy of the
targeted ads served on Facebook’s social networking platform to WhatsApp users that are also Facebook users.’
26. See M.A. Ruggiero, Unfair Commercial Practices, Consumer and Internal Market Protection: A Comparative Study,
MA Thesis, 2017, p. 37.
14 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 28(1)
such as Legislative Decree No. 145/2007 (LD 145/07) on misleading and comparative advertise-
ments (business-to-business practice)27 and Legislative Decree No. 146/2007 (LD 146/07) on
unfair business to consumer practices (business-to-consumer practice).28 Harmonization of the
unfair B2C practices in Italy led to the implementation of LD 146/07 in the Italian Consumer Code
(ICC).29 The second chapter of the ICC set out the rules on unfair commercial practices, aiming to
ensure adequate protection for consumers.30 What follows from the UCPD implementation in Italy
is consumer protection from unfair commercial practices, which is an essential part of the ICC.
Besides the fact that Italy used two different pieces of legislation to clarify consumer protection
from unfair practice and unfair competition, the enforcement of both is the responsibility of
Autorità Garante Della Concorrenza e Del Mercato (AGCM).31 Since the AGCM is an indepen-
dent administrative authority, it has powers to investigate the repression of unfair commercial
practices, misleading and unlawful comparative advertising, and the application of conflict of
interest’s laws to government office holders.32
The AGCM took different investigations, but different scholars’ debates were caused by the Big
Data sector investigation from May 2017. The most prominent finding to emerge from this
investigation was defining a regulatory framework able to protect privacy and consumers, to foster
competition in the markets of the digital economy, and to promote pluralism within the digital
economy. However, the most exciting result was that the AGCM took two decisions considering
ICC rules on unfair commercial practices and imposed fines on WhatsApp and Facebook.
In addition, Garante per la Protezione Dei Dati Personali33 as an independent administrative
authority followed the AGCM, and it imposed a fine for Facebook based on violations of national
data protection law attached to the Cambridge Analytica Data Scandal. The fine was set based on
the former Italian Privacy Code as the investigation was initiated before the GDPR application.
The decision followed the first decision, which prohibited further processing the data related to
Italian users by Facebook.34 All in all, Italian case law provides examples that settled either ICC
rules on unfair commercial practices or rules on data protection.
The importance of the Italian example of investigations against a dominant market player such
as Facebook is a big step for several reasons. Firstly, it presents privacy violations in Italy based on
the ICC. Secondly, it is the support for digital activists to strengthen the case against privacy
violations in the other EU Member States.
27. For more, see the text of the LD, see AGCM, Legislative Decree no. 145 of 2 August 2007, https://en.agcm.it/en/about-
us/legislation-agcm/detail?id¼4eed4de2-6465-40a0-9524-c9dccc7135f7&parent¼Consumer%20protection&
parentUrl¼/en/about-us/legislation-agcm/consumer-protection.
28. For more, see the text of the LD, ibid.
29. Legislative Decree No 146 of 2 August 2007, https://e-justice.europa.eu/fileDownload.do?id¼9eab82ae-7398-4cb0-
aa18-a9577845ae57.
30. It is worth mentioning that the implementation of the UCPD has been completed by Legislative Decree 221/07, which
tried to harmonize the text of the ICC with a list of rights guaranteed to the consumers. In particular, the right to have
commercial practices with respect to ‘good faith, fairness and loyalty’ has been introduced at the letter c-bis. Besides,
Law No. 27, from March 24th, 2012, extended the protection against unfair practices.
31. Italian Competition and Market Authority.
32. See AGCM, What the authority is, https://en.agcm.it/en/about-us/.
33. The Italian Data Protection Authority.
34. More about decision available at Garante per la Protezione dei Dai Personali, Ordinanza ingiunzione nei confronti di
Facebook Ireland Ltd e Facebook Italy s.r.l. - 14 giugno 2019 [9121486], www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/
docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9121486.
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1. The WhatsApp Case
A California-based company, WhatsApp Inc., which is providing services via the smart
mobile app (for example, WhatsApp Messenger), became part of the Facebook Group. The
merger activities between Facebook and WhatsApp caused an investigation by the Italian
national authority.
In 2016, the AGCM opened two separate proceedings concerning alleged infringements of
the ICC.35 The first enforcement addressed imbalances between users and providers, based on
the application of some contractual clauses included in WhatsApp Messenger’s Terms of
Service (Terms). The AGCM stated that these clauses were unfair. The other enforcement
referred to personal data processing. The AGCM’s investigation addressed WhatsApp’s
aggressive conduct in forcing users to accept new Terms. In addition, the acceptance of new
Terms meant the automatic transfer of consumers’ data to Facebook. In sum, WhatsApp
convinced users to believe that without granting consent for personal data sharing, they would
no longer be able to use the service. Here it is essential to clarify that the modified Terms
were mostly forced on users who already used WhatsApp Messenger. Since users could
decide not to give their consent to share with Facebook the information of their WhatsApp
accounts and still be able to use WhatsApp, they were unable to accept only part of the
WhatsApp’s new Terms.
The most interesting aspect was the implementation practice of the new Terms, by which they
were implemented while insufficient information was available for consumers. Firstly, an in-app
procedure for obtaining the new Term’s acceptance was characterized by an excessive emphasis
placed on the need to accept the new conditions within the following 30 days or lose the oppor-
tunity to use the service at all. Secondly, inadequate information followed the new Terms. Based
on that, consumers were without the possibility to deny consent for sharing personal data with
Facebook. Finally, acceptance of new Terms led to difficulty in activation of the opt-out option. In
line with the AGCM opinion, the nature of the services itself and the importance of WhatsApp as
an operator led to inadequate attention to the consequences.
Concerning Articles 20, 24 and 25 ICC, the AGCM found that WhatsApp’s conduct constituted
an unfair and aggressive commercial practice. The investigation of the AGCM placed several
crucial points.
Firstly, the AGCM clarified that the practice at issue did not affect any of the Italian Data
Protection Authority competences, which means that the AGCM objected to subject matter
jurisdiction.36
Secondly, the AGCM considered Article 27.6 of the ICC, which sets out the requirement for the
AGCM to obtain a preliminary opinion from the communications authority (AGCOM).37 Since the
WhatsApp’s practice referred to electronic communications, the AGCOM issued the statement, in
which it argued that Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp hold two of the top three positions in the
35. The first proceeding was about WhatsApp’s Terms of Service, and it had started on October 20th, 2016. (Case No.
CV154: WhatsApp - Unfair Terms). The second proceeding was about sharing personal data between Facebook and
WhatsApp, and it had started on October 27th, 2016. (Case No. PS10601: WhatsApp - Sharing personal data with
Facebook).
36. As the AGCM concludes it, the AGCM would suspend its proceedings under Article 27.1bis of the ICC. The cited
Article establishes that the AGCM exercises its jurisdiction on unfair commercial practices in regulated sectors upon
receiving the competent authority’s advisory opinion. However, the same Article did not materialize in this case.
37. Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni.
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market for instant messaging. The AGCOM concluded that the use of both smartphones and the
Internet facilitate and significantly expand the effects of the commercial practice, strengthening the
undue influence on consumers.
Thirdly, an important issue during the investigation was whether the WhatsApp aggressive
conduct falls within the ICC scope. WhatsApp’s defensive argument was that its main function is
to transmit messages between users rather than advertising. Consequently, WhatsApp argued that
the transfer of data to Facebook would not constitute a commercial practice in the future. Follow-
ing this defence argument, the AGCM rejected it by pointing out that the use of data as counter-
performance in social media is recognized in the context of both antitrust and consumer protection
law. The AGCM also concluded that WhatsApp shared personal data inter alia to improve adver-
tising, causing financial growth for Facebook.
Fourthly, WhatsApp argued that there was no harassment, coercion or undue influence,
which are elements required under Article 25 of the ICC for an aggressive practice. Following
Article 24 of the ICC, WhatsApp argued that new Terms offered users proper notice through
an unavoidable full screen informing them about the Terms update. WhatsApp also claimed
that two additional informative pages included even a summary of the main changes. On the
contrary, the AGCM concluded that the initial screen and the pre-ticked checkbox failed to
explain the possibility of refusing the data sharing with Facebook and rendered the concrete
exercise of this option impossible. Also, the AGCM concluded that it was possible only to
modify user selection through a more complex procedure and that instructions to do it were
only available on the second screen. Since WhatsApp offered to consumers only an excessive
emphasis placed on the need to accept the new conditions within the following 30 days or
lose the opportunity to use the service at all, the AGCM concluded that it caused uncertainty
about the continuation of the service.
Finally, considering Article 20 ICC, WhatsApp argued that new Terms exceeded the amount of
information provided by other widely used mobile applications, which consumers can reasonably
expect from a professional. However, the AGCM considered that WhatsApp, with its 30–50
million users, represents an important player in the relevant national market. In its conclusion,
the AGCM stated that WhatsApp’s conduct significantly affected the freedom of choice or beha-
viour of the average consumers, which led to a commercial decision that would not otherwise take
place.
For all the reasons mentioned above, the AGCM found that WhatsApp’s practice violated
Articles 20 (unfair commercial practice), 24 (aggressive commercial practice) and 25 (resort to
harassment, coercion or undue influence) of the ICC.
The AGCM qualified the fine concerning Article 27.13 ICC, which stated several factors
have to be taken into account to quantify the fine. The first factor was the weight of the
infringement, which was serious, given the conclusion of the AGCM (for example, the
insidious nature of the extraction of consent to the use of data for profiling and advertising).
The second factor was the professional nature of the company, which was that it had the
status of a leader in a market. The third factor was the duration of the infringement, which the
AGCM found was problematic. As a result, the AGCM imposed the fine in the full amount of
€3 million on WhatsApp.
2. The Facebook Case
Cambridge Analytica Ltd (CA), with its seat in London, was a British political consulting firm that
combined misappropriation of digital assets, data mining, data brokerage and data analysis with
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strategic communication during electoral processes.38 In 2015 it was uncovered that CA collected
the personal data of up to 87 million Facebook users39 via the 270,000 Facebook users who used a
Facebook app called ‘This Is Your Digital Life’. Despite the fact that the majority of users did not
explicitly permit CA to access their data, the Facebook app ‘This Is Your Digital Life’ allowed free
access of information on the user’s friend’s network as well. The most obvious fact here was the
breaching Facebook’s of terms of service by giving the data to CA. Since the CA collected the
personal data of millions of users’ Facebook profiles without their consent and used it for political
advertising purposes, it was a major political scandal in early 2018. Moreover, the CA scandal has
already been described as a crucial moment in the public understanding of personal data and led to
calls for more robust regulation for tech companies that are using personal data.
The AGCM opened the investigation in April 2018 and closed it in November 2018.40 The
investigation followed the supposed violation of the ICC by Facebook Ireland Ltd and its parent
company Facebook Inc, which was attached to the CA scandal. At the end of the investigation, the
AGCM found that Facebook violated articles 21 and 22 of the ICC. Facebook’s misleading
conduct led users to register on the Facebook platform, while not adequately and immediately
informing them during the creation of the account that the data they provided was for commercial
purposes. Besides the fact that Facebook offered the services for free, it did not correctly inform
them of the commercial objectives (for example, profitable ends). Consequently, Facebook
encouraged users to make a transactional decision that they would not have taken otherwise
(namely, to register in the social network and to continue using it). Considering the AGCM
opinion, Facebook provided general and incomplete information and did not adequately make a
distinction between the use of data to personalize the service and the use of data to carry out
advertising campaigns aimed at specific targets.
Further, the AGCM found that Facebook violated Articles 24 and 25 ICC by forcing an
aggressive practice. Facebook used the pre-selection of the ‘Active Platform’ as a function for
pre-setting its user’s ability to access websites and external apps using their accounts. This Face-
book service enabled the transfer of a user’s data to single websites and online apps, without any
user’s consent manifestation. All in all, Facebook used the opt-out pre-selection mechanism
concerning data sharing whenever users accessed third-party websites and apps, including games,
by using their Facebook accounts. Users could only deselect the pre-setting operated by Facebook
without being able to make a free and informed choice.
38. See C. Cadwalladr and E. Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge
Analytica in Major Data Breach, The Guardian (2018), www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analy
tica-facebook-influence-us-election.
39. The Guardian’s journalist, Harry Davies, was reported in December 2015 for the first time about the CA scandal. He
reported that CA was working for the United States Senator Ted Cruz using data harvested from millions of people’s
Facebook accounts without their consent. However, the scandal finally erupted in March 2018. An ex-CA employee
Christopher Wylie had been an anonymous source for an article in 2017 in The Observer, headlined ‘The Great British
Brexit Robbery’. He told the Observer: ‘We exploited Facebook to harvest millions of people’s profiles. And built
models to exploit what we knew about them and target their inner demons. That was the basis the entire company was
built on.’
40. Press release: AGCM, ‘Facebook Fined 10 Million Euros by the ICA for Unfair Commercial Practices for Using its
Subscribers’ Data for Commercial Purposes’, https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-releases/2018/12/Facebook-fined-10-
million-Euros-by-the-ICA-for-unfair-commercial-practices-for-using-its-subscribers%E2%80%99-data-for-commer
cial-purposes.
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Consequently, the users faced a significant restriction on the use of Facebook when they
decided to limit their consent. Since Facebook transferred users’ data to third parties only for
commercial purposes, it caused undue influence on its users. Consequently, Facebook has
been fined a full amount of €10 million by the AGCM for misleading users over its data
practices.
The most prominent finding to emerge from the Italian example on the WhatsApp and Face-
book cases is the enforcement of valid user’s consent through the consumer protection agenda.
Moreover, Italian case laws are an excellent example of the practical application of the rules on
unfair commercial practice.
B. Example of Germany
In Germany, consumer protection is regulated within two systems: statutory rules and self-
regulatory codes. One of the self-regulatory codes is the Act Against Unfair Competition
(UWG),41 which is a single statute with common provisions for competitors, consumers and other
market participants against unfair acts.42 The UWG, which dates back to 1909,43 takes the leading
role whenever unfair commercial practice is concerned. The UWG prohibits certain trade prac-
tices, which are considered unfair. Through time, the UWG was changing, aiming to modernize
German law against unfair competition. Moreover, Germany was notable for successive cases
associated with the unfair competition that referred to the CJEU.44
German legislators tried to balance the EU ambition to harmonize legislation against unfair
commercial practices through the national legal system considering developments in CJEU
case law, and the new UWG passed in 2004. The basis of German unfair commercial practice
law framed with Article 1 UWG, offers protection for competitors, consumers and public
interests in case of the undistorted competition. Article 1 UWG45 is the mirror of the UCPD.
However, consumer protection is also provided by the general clause stated in Article 3
UWG. Article 3 UWG prohibits ‘unfair acts of competition which are liable to have more
than an insubstantial impact on competition to the detriment of competitors, consumers or
other market participants’. Further, it stipulates threefold criteria: acts of competition, unfair-
ness and more than an insubstantial impact on competition. Since the fair-trading law is
covered by both civil and criminal law, the UWG offers some criminal sanctions besides
administrative sanctions.
41. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb.
42. It is worth mentioning that consumer law in Germany is not codified in one comprehensive legislative act, but rather
spread over several statutes.
43. UWG was originally mainly concerned with the interests of honest businesses. However, the case law developed by the
courts based on Article 1 UWG 1909 took into account the interests of the consumer and the public. Furthermore,
Germany introduced the right to sue for consumers’ associations in 1965, which meant that UWG directly also protects
the (collective) interests of consumers. See R. Podszun, C. Busch and F. Henning-Bodewig, ‘Consumer Law in
Germany: A Shift to Public Enforcement?’, 8 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law (2019), p. 75–82.
44. For instance decisions in Case C-315/1992 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb e.V. v. Clinique Laboratoires SNC et Estée
Lauder Cosmetics GmbH, EU:C:1994:34; Case C-220/98 Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co OHG v. Lancaster
Group GmbH, EU:C:2000:8; Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide GmbH and Rudolf Tusky v. Oberkreisdirektor des
Kreises Steinfurt– Amt für Lebensmittelüberwachung, EU:C:1998:369.
45. See Article 1 of the UWG.
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Germany is an example of a state where complaints may be submitted by competitors as well as
by consumers.46 Considering individual consumer claims regarding unfair terms and conditions
and other violations of consumer law, the German Civil Code is the primary basis.47 Although
Germany has introduced many rules on fair trading, the emphasis is on cases brought by compet-
itors, which is reflected in the case law. Consequently, many of the rules in UWG can be viewed
not so much as protecting consumers but rather as controlling competition from competitors. In
that regard, literature reviews concluded that the case law in Germany was often to the benefit of a
competitor rather than the injured consumer.
Compared to Italy, the enforcement of the UWG is complicated. Firstly, Article 8 UWG defined
the role of the Centre for Protection against Unfair Competition,48 which aimed to advance trade,
industry and commerce in the Federal Republic of Germany. It was the most important institution,
which had a formal (that is, judicially authorized) right to initiate legal action against those who
infringe laws relating to the UWG. Secondly, Article 13 UWG established the exclusive compe-
tence of the District Courts for hearing claims based on the UWG. The jurisdiction lies with the
Court in the district where the defendant has his business establishment or place of residence,49 or
with the Court in the district where the act was carried out.50 Thirdly, just as in the provisions of the
former UWG, Article 15 UWG defined mediation boards. Finally, the 9th Amendment51 to the Act
against Restraints of Competition (GWB)52 in 2017 has empowered the Federal Cartel Office
(FCO)53 to carry out sector inquiries for violations of the UWG. The FCO has established a
division for consumer protection with the aim of intervention in court proceedings relating to
breaches of consumer protection law.
1. The WhatsApp case
Unlike Italy, the merger activities between Facebook and WhatsApp in Germany were first the
subject of an order issued by the Hamburg Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of
Information (HmbBFDI),54 followed by the ruling of the district administrative courts. Moreover,
the activities of the Federation of Consumer Protection Organizations marked the WhatsApp case
in Germany. However, neither the HmbBFDI investigation nor the Federation of Consumer
46. For instance, the German Centre for Protection against Unfair Competition received around 14,000 requests and
complaints per year, mostly from competitors or trade associations.
47. If, for example, a no negotiated fee clause is considered unfair and invalid under Article 307 to 309 of Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch (BGB), the consumer has a claim against the business under the rules on unjust enrichment (Article 812
para. 1 BGB). The same is true if an extra fee has been ‘agreed’ upon via a pre-ticked box in violation of Article 312 a
para. 3 sent. 2 BGB. See R. Podszun, C. Busch and F. Henning-Bodewig, 8 Journal of European Consumer and Market
Law (2019), p. 75–82.
48. See Wetbewerbszentrale, Unser Arbeit, www.wettbewerbszentrale.de/de/institution/profil/auftrag/.
49. Article 14(1) of the UWG.
50. Article 14(2) of the UWG.
51. Under the 9th Amendment to the GWB, which entered into force on 9 June 2017, the FCO has been conferred the
competence to launch sector inquiries for consumer protection. Therefore, consumer protection has been given a new
impetus in the framework of competition law. Furthermore, the FCO is now entitled to intervene in court proceedings
relating to infringements of consumer protection laws.
52. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen.
53. Bundeskartellamt. For more information, see Bundeskartellamt, The Bundeskartellamt, www.bundeskartellamt.de/EN/
AboutUs/aboutus_node.html.
54. Der Hamburgische Beauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit has the mandate to control the administration
and the economy in Hamburg with unrestricted access to all data processing companies or authorities or institutions.
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Protection Organizations investigation followed the UWG rules. Although the Federation of Con-
sumer Protection Organizations has played an active role in WhatsApp case, the German example
on WhatsApp raised just the significance of the national data protection law.55 Besides, while the
HmbBFDI directed investigation against Facebook, the Federation of Consumer Protection Orga-
nizations investigated WhatsApp. Consequently, the German example on the WhatsApp and Face-
book merger activates, led to the conclusion that the same company for the same activities has been
investigated by different authorities from another corner, whereas appropriate consumer protection
is debatable.
Considering the investigation of the HmbBFDI, the conclusion was that Facebook and What-
sApp as independent companies processed users’ data based on their Terms. Besides, the
HmbBFDI considered that WhatsApp informed users in August 2016 that their data would also
be transferred to Facebook without obtaining users’ valid consent. Interestingly, the HmbBFDI,
just like the Italian AGCM, concluded that new Terms did not give a choice to the users. However,
the HmbBFDI considered this practice to be unlawful under national data protection law.
Since the HmbBFDI issued a decision using an administrative order, it ordered the immediate
enforcement. In line with the order, Facebook was prohibited from collecting the personal data of
WhatsApp users and storing them. However, Facebook has appealed against the order. The legal
proceedings were in the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court and the Higher Administrative
Court in Hamburg. In the first instance, Facebook appealed intending to repeal the immediate
enforcement of HmbBFDI’s administrative order. However, the Court rejected a Facebook request
based on the fact that there was no legal basis for the planned data transfer. The court of the first
instance concluded that the complete data transfer was necessary neither for network security and
business analysis nor for advertising optimization. Besides, the court accepted the HmbBFDI
conclusion that there was no valid consent from WhatsApp users for data transfer with Facebook.
Finally, the court of the first instance considered that the interest of German WhatsApp users was
above the economic benefit of Facebook.
One of the questions that were partly open during the first instance of court proceedings was the
applicability of national law. However, the Court stated that EU data protection provisions had to
be followed, besides Facebook’s argument about Irish Law applicability. Consequently, Facebook
was under obligation to introduce a lawful consent procedure under previous German data pro-
tection law.56
The court of the second instance issued its decision based on the carefully analysed process of
disclosures made by WhatsApp. Just like the Italian AGCM, the court stated that users accepted
new Terms, which included consents to the processing of user information, to continue using the
55. Previous German Federal Data Protection Act (DSGVO) permitted the collection, processing and use of personal data
only if a data controller meets certain requirements (the details of which are not relevant here) or if the data subject has
consented. Under the BDSG, ‘effective consent’ must be based on a data subject’s ‘free decision’. Moreover, the data
processors had to inform data subjects of the purpose of collection, processing or use and, insofar as the circumstances
of the individual case dictate or upon request, of the consequences of withholding consent. The DSGVO stipulated that
‘if consent is to be given together with other written declarations, it shall be made distinguishable in its appearance’.
Considering that the GDPR entered into force after the decision in Germany, it should be noted that it contains similar
requirements. Controllers may process data only based on at least one of the conditions defined in Article 6(1), one of
which is obtaining user consent. Besides, consent is defined in Article 4(11) as any ‘freely given, specific, informed,
and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes’.
56. Article 4 (11) of DSGVO.
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service. However, the court found that WhatsApp did not provide its users with the opportunity to
give valid consent to the data processing as required under national data protection law. Just like
the Italian AGCM, the court explained that WhatsApp users were not adequately informed about
the circumstances under which they consented to the processing of their data and the consequences
of their decisions.
The HmbBFDI filed the complaint to the CJEU, considering Article 77 GDPR in May 2018.57
Regarding the complaint, WhatsApp ‘used a privacy policy and terms of service, which the data
subject had to agree. If this privacy policy must be read on the screen of a mobile phone, it takes 89
screen pages to read the whole text’, which means that new privacy policy was ‘an aggressive and
absurd attempt to deprive data subjects of their rights guaranteed by the GDPR’. The merger
activities between Facebook and WhatsApp happened before the GDPR was officially applicable
in the CJEU. Consequently, the HmbBFDI requested retroactive application of the GDPR. The
basis for retroactive application of the GDPR according to the HmbBFDI was Recital 71. It
clarified that the controller might establish processing operations on the consent obtained before
25 May 2018, with proof that such consent followed the GDPR requirements. Finally, the
HmbBFDI requested issuing the fine under Article 83(5)(a), which would be about €1.3 billion
(4% of the worldwide revenue). However, the CJEU has not still settled the case.
Although the decisions issued in Germany had a similar conclusion to the AGCM in Italy, they
did not follow the rules on unfair commercial practice from the UWG. All in all, the decisions
made under German data protection law provided helpful guidance on valid consent, but only
under the data protection law.
In addition, the WhatsApp case was looked at by the Federation of German Consumer Orga-
nizations,58 which has initiated two different investigations referring to WhatsApp.
The first investigation related to the WhatsApp Terms, which were in English.59 The Court of
Appeal Berlin issued a judgment against WhatsApp, prohibiting WhatsApp’s use of English Terms
on its website for contracts with users in Germany unless the Terms are available in the German
language. In line with the court’s opinion, a complex set of contractual Terms available only in the
English language led to the conclusion that the whole set of contractual Terms should be deemed
void because of a German Civil Code breach.60 The court considered that consumers could not
expect the Terms in the English language since the whole website was offered in the German
language. Finally, the court concluded that all clauses of WhatsApp’s Terms should be invalid and
unenforceable because they were in English.
The second investigation related to merger activities between Facebook and WhatsApp. The
Federation of German Consumer Organizations shown activities in the very early beginning after
new WhatsApp Terms entered into force. Firstly, it was issued the order, which aimed a range of
issues, including the transfer of data to Facebook. Although the Federation of German Consumer
Organizations considered collecting and sharing data to be illegal based on national data protection
law, WhatsApp did not follow the order. Consequently, the Federation of German Consumers
Organizations filed a complaint against WhatsApp before the court of the first instance in Berlin.
57. For more information about the complaint, see Noyb, https://noyb.eu/en/.
58. For more information, see www.vzbv.de/.
59. Press release: VZBV, 17 May 2016, ‘WhatsApp muss AGB auf Deutsch bereitstellen’, www.vzbv.de/pressemitteilung/
whatsapp-muss-agb-auf-deutsch-bereitstellen.
60. Article 307(1) BGB.
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Just as with the AGCM and the HmbBFDI, the Federation of German Consumer Organizations
believed that the changes to the Terms meant acting against the law. Moreover, the Federation of
German Consumers Organizations argued that collected user data should not be shared with
Facebook, even though the users concerned have a Facebook account. Finally, the main request
of the complaint was that data shared with Facebook should be deleted, along with a further ban on
transfers of such data. Although the case has still not been settled by the Berlin court of the first
instance, it is not reasonable to expect other consequences similar to those in the case launched by
HmbBFDI. Perhaps the Federation of German Consumer Organizations’ activities would be more
appropriate if the complaints were legally based on rules on unfair commercial practice.
2. The Facebook Case
In March 2016, the FCO considering German competition law formally initiated proceedings
against Facebook based on the suspicion that the social network was abusing its market power
by violating data protection rules. Further, the FCO in 2017 published a detailed preliminary
assessment and background information to the proceedings. Following an investigation of Face-
book into the abuse of a dominant position, the FCO issued the final decision in 2019.61 The ruling
of the FCO was prohibiting Facebook Inc., Menlo Park, USA, Facebook Ireland Ltd., Dublin,
Ireland and Facebook Germany GmbH, Hamburg, Germany (Facebook) from processing user data
from different sources without the user’s consent.62 Interestingly, the FCO based the prohibition on
Article 19(1) of the GWB, although the decision accepted the enforcement of data protection based
on the UWG. A possible explanation might be that the FCO considered data protection regulations,
which do not suspend abuse control. In line with the FCO opinion, the GDPR does not explicitly
state that its provisions are final, so it could not be assumed that the GDPR leaves no further scope
for examination by other authorities and under different aspects. Consequently, the FCO has found
the place for applicability of Article 19 (1) GWB in the Facebook case.
Comparing to the Facebook case in Italy, it might be concluded that the FCO investigation was a
bit different. The FCO investigation considered the way of sharing personal data made by plat-
forms associated with the Facebook Business Tools (for example, Facebook’s subsidiaries –
WhatsApp and Instagram). The investigation covered several issues.
Firstly, the FCO examined whether the Facebook data policy was appropriate based on the data
protection offered by the GDPR. In that regard, the FCO concluded that Facebook’s processing of
personal data from other corporate services and Facebook Business Tools enabled profiling and
device fingerprinting. Based on such processing of personal data, Facebook violated the require-
ments defined in the GDPR. Facebook did not provide valid consent concerning Article 6(1)(a)63
of the GDPR, affecting users’ consent under data protection requirements. In the opinion of the
FCO, data processing to the third party is not justified without the user’s voluntary consent.
Moreover, the FCO found that voluntary consent for the processing of the user information could
not be assumed if a user’s consent was a prerequisite for using Facebook’s service in the first place.
61. FCO, Case B6-22/16, a decision from 7 February 2019.
62. The decision is available at Bundeskartellamt, Decision of Facebook-proceeding, (2019), www.bundeskartellamt.de/
SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/AktuelleMeldungen/2019/11_07_2019_decisionFacebook.html.
63. As stated in Article 6(1)(a), processing shall be lawful if the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or
her personal data for one or more specific purposes.
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Secondly, the FCO examined Facebook’s market power. As stated in the FCO opinion, the
violation of data protection requirements was a manifestation of Facebook’s market power. The
basis for such opinion the FCO found in case law, which showed that the conduct (that is, the
violation) was only possible in the first place because of market dominance and that other market
participants did not have a chance to behave similarly. In the opinion of the FCO, Facebook, with
its dominant position, prevented users from protecting their data from being processed from a large
number of sources (that is, they did not have the possibility to decide autonomously on the
disclosure of their data). Further, an essential element of the market power was the strong direct
network effects of Facebook’s business model and the difficulties associated with switching to
another social network.
Thirdly, the FCO found that Facebook data policy was abusive concerning the Article 19 (1)
GWB since it allowed Facebook to collect user- and device-related data from outside Facebook
and merge it with data collected on Facebook.
Finally, the FCO considered that Facebook is the dominant company in the German market for
users as regards Article 18(1)(3) and (3a) GWB, as Facebook has a scope of action in the German
national market. Consequently, it is not sufficiently controlled by competition law.
Considering all investigated issues, the FCO has prohibited the data processing policy Facebook
imposes on its users and its corresponding implementation concerning Article 19(1) GWB and
ordered the termination of this conduct. In addition, the FCO decision contained the prohibition
relating to Terms of personal data processing.64 Considering the end of the violations, the FCO
required in its decision that Facebook implement the necessary changes and adapt its data and
cookie policies within 12 months. Facebook was given an additional deadline of four months to
present an implementation road map for the adjustments.
Facebook appealed against this decision to the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court with the aim
of delaying the application of the order. The Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court settled the case
very fast by issuing a decision in August 2019.65 Interestingly, the court made a different decision
to the FCO with respect to crucial legal issues. Firstly, the court did not accept the FCO’s opinion
about a possible violation of privacy rules which automatically violated competition rules. Sec-
ondly, the Court decided that users autonomously decide whether they agree with Facebook’s
Terms when signing up for the service. In addition, the court did not agree that Facebook’s data
collection exploits users since they could continue to make the same data available to other
companies. In that respect, the court did not find that Facebook is using a dominant position when
it comes to data processing. Considering the ruling of the court, Facebook does not have to
implement the decision of the FCO. Of course, the FCO appealed against Düsseldorf Higher
Regional Court decision to the Federal Court of Justice. However, the case before Federal Court
Justice has still not been settled.
The FCO’s ruling provides an impressive legal novelty based on a combination of the data
protection law rules and competition law rules. However, it represents a stretch to some extent. All
64. The Facebook Terms expressly stated that they involve the collection of user- and device-related data from other
corporate services and Facebook Business Tools without the user’s consent and their combination with Facebook data
for purposes related to the social network. The FCO also prohibited the implementation of these terms and conditions in
actual data processing procedures, which Facebook performs based on its data and cookie policies.
65. The decision is available at CPI, Germany: Facebook Succeeds in Blocking German Ban on Data Collection, (2019)
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/germany-cartel-office-to-take-facebook-case-to-high-court/.
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in all, the Federal Court of Justice, with its decision, will answer whether the FCO ruling could
prove to be very helpful for private users or not.
Besides the FCO investigation, in 2018, HmbBFDI announced that the investigation against
Facebook is open concerning data abuse on the Facebook platform. In line with the Hamburg Data
Protection Officer’s opinion, Facebook could face a fine of up to €300,000, but only in a case
where German users’ data are breached.66 Despite the announcement, this investigation still has no
further step.
The Federation of Consumer Protection Organizations filed the complaint against Facebook for
violation of the GDPR’s request on informed consent with its privacy settings and some of its
Terms. The ruling of the first and second court’s instances were following the case.67
Although the Federation of the Consumer Protection Organization argued that the advertising
quote, such as ‘Facebook is and remains free’, was misleading, the court of the second instance did
not conclude the same. In the opinion of the court, the advertising quote only referred to the fact
that the services could be used without cash payments or other loss of assets. Interestingly, one of
Facebook’s arguments during the court proceedings was that the rules on unfair commercial
practice were applicable. However, this was rejected by the courts of the second instance with
the explanations that it was without importance, considering that the users were affected by missed
effective consent for the use of personal data. The court of the second instance also prohibited
several points in Facebook’s Terms: firstly, the user’s agreement to the use of the user’s name and
profile picture for commercial, sponsored, or related content; and secondly, the clause about the
user’s agreement in advance to all future changes to the Facebook data privacy policy. Following
the court’s opinion, such pre-formulated declarations did not meet the requirements for valid
consent to the use of personal data defined in the GDPR. Finally, a clause that required users to
provide their real name, among other things, was already legally prohibited in Germany.
The most prominent finding to emerge from this ruling is the importance of the German
consumer protection in the enforcement of effective consumer consent through the data protection
law. The decision of the Berlin court has enthroned the authority for German consumer protection
authorities to take legal action in the event of the GDPR’s violations. Consequently, the mentioned
decision is not an example of effectively applied rules on unfair commercial practice when it
comes to data processing. All in all, the Facebook example in Germany suggests that the Feder-
ation of Consumer Protection Organizations was more successful than the FCO.
C. Example of the UK
The United Kingdom is often seen as the Member State with the strongest self-regulation tradition
in this area. Similar to Germany’s legislators, the UK’s legislators regulated consumer protection
against unfair commercial practices through a self-regulatory code.
The CPR, as a single statue, came into force on May 26th, 2008. Since the CPR was a new
unique corpus of legislation, it fully implemented the UCPD into UK law. A possible explanation
for new single statues on unfair commercial practice might be that before the UCPD, the UK
legislative framework did not have any unique corpus of legislation for fighting against unfair
66. See DW, Facebook Could Face Fine if German Users Affected by Cambridge Analytica Data Breach, (2018), www.
dw.com/en/facebook-could-face-fine-if-german-users-affected-by-cambridge-analytica-data-breach/a-43476184/.
67. Press release, available at Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband, Facebook verstößt gegen Datenschutzrecht, (2020),
www.vzbv.de/pressemitteilung/facebook-verstoesst-gegen-datenschutzrecht.
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practices. Considering that the UK legal background is different from the majority of the EU
countries, different pieces of legislation were regulated based on precedent case law, but without
specific sanctions aimed at better enforcement of consumers’ rights. Although the CPR is the
mirror of the UCPD, it also extended the scope to situations where a consumer sells goods to trade.
However, the prohibitions defended within the CPR are the same as the UCPD’s rules, and the CPR
offers a three-tier division. Consequently, it consists of three prohibitions: a general ban on unfair
commercial practices; prohibitions on misleading and aggressive practices; and 31 practices pro-
hibited in all circumstances. The CPR is divided into three parts. The first part of the CPR contains
the definition of essential notions, such as the average consumer, commercial practice, goods and
invitation to purchase. The second part of the CPR is dedicated to the prohibition of unfair
practices, with a scheme and wording that follow the European implementation. Finally, the last
part of the CPR comprises 31 prohibited commercial practices, which are unfair in all circum-
stances. In addition, in the UK, another essential piece of law for defending consumers against
unfair practices was adopted in 2014.68
Just as in Germany, the UK is an example of a state where civil or criminal enforcement
complaints are allowed. The UK’s enforcers promote compliance by the most appropriate means,
in line with their enforcement policies and priorities, consistent with available resources. In line
with scholars’ opinions, the UK is an example of a country which offers public enforcement of the
UCPD’s rules based on the implementation of consumer protection by criminal law. By contrast,
Germany is an example of a country which employs private enforcement because, in practice, the
private party’s complaints result. However, in the UK, complaints can be submitted by consumers.
CPR sets out the obligation for enforcement for Local Authority Trading Standards Services
(TSS), the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland and the Office for
Fair Trading (OFT). However, as part of the UK Government’s reforms to the arrangements for
competition, consumer protection and consumer credit regulation, the OFT was closed on 31 March
2014. Its work and responsibilities passed to several different bodies. Consequently, the Compe-
tition and Markets Authority (CMA) has taken on the competition and certain consumer functions
of the OFT. In addition, the CMA mostly promotes competition, within and outside the UK, for the
benefit of consumers. Also, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (Northern Ireland)
has been replaced by the Department for the Economy (Northern Ireland).
There are some activities which are aimed at consumer protection on online platforms, which is
considered part of the role of the CMA. In 2019, the CMA published an update on online platforms
and a digital advertising market study, including concerns and potential interventions.69 The study
refers to a summary of research on consumers’ attitudes and behaviour on online platforms. The
study brought together the most relevant academic literature and consumer survey material. The
study’s Appendix G aims to identify where there might be gaps in the evidence base and where
further research would be useful when it comes to consumer data processing. Based on the central
issues (for example, consumers’ awareness of the value of data to platforms, consumers’ feelings
of data control and consumers’ attitudes towards data processing), Appendix G debates the issue of
whether consumers’ awareness is an essential element for better consumer protection on online
68. CPAR (the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014), www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/870/regula
tion/3/made, which introduced the right for consumers to redress.
69. For more information, see Gov.uk, Online Platforms and Digital Advertising Market Study, (2019), www.gov.uk/cma-
cases/online-platforms-and-digital-advertising-market-study.
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platforms. In line with Appendix G, consumer information should be regarded more as a process
rather than a one-off act. The focus should be more on emphasizing the specific harmful effects
that may emerge from the collection and analysis of personal data. Consequently, such a focus
could help to raise awareness among consumers and could increase motivation to engage with the
terms and conditions of online platforms.70 Besides, Appendix G has stated that, considering some
evidence, better protection of consumers requires more regulations for online platforms.71
In the end, it is recognised that there is a very active role in upholding information rights in the
public interest for the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).
1. WhatsApp case
WhatsApp was the subject matter of an investigation in the UK. The UK ICO conducted the
investigation.72 The investigation on WhatsApp began in August 2016, and during the investiga-
tion, the ICO found several essential facts. Firstly, WhatsApp has not identified a lawful basis of
processing for any such sharing of personal data. Secondly, WhatsApp has failed to provide users
with adequate, fair processing information concerning any such sharing of personal data. Finally,
concerning existing users, such sharing would involve the processing of personal data for a purpose
that is incompatible with the primary purpose of collecting such data.
The ICO settled the case in March 2018. The investigation finished with a formal decision by
the ICO, obliging WhatsApp not to share personal data with Facebook until data protection
concerns were addressed. Interestingly, the ICO’s decision was the reason for the signed public
commitment by WhatsApp. However, the ICO found that there were no criteria for issuing a
monetary fine since WhatsApp convinced the ICO that no UK user data was shared with Facebook.
Considering that the WhatsApp case in the UK followed the rules of the UK Data Protection Act,
WhatsApp was obligated, from the date of the decision, not to share personal data with Facebook,
until it could satisfy the requirements of the GDPR.
Unlike in Italy and Germany, where the investigation against WhatsApp is based on unlawful
data processing, the direction of the UK’s investigation depended on whether WhatsApp legally
shared users’ data with Facebook. In the end, the ICO concluded that the UK Data Protection Act
did not prevent a company from sharing personal data since it only had to follow the legal
requirements. In that respect, the ICO’s investigation did not concern WhatsApp’s sharing of
personal data with Facebook when Facebook was only providing a support service to WhatsApp.
In line with the FCO decision, WhatsApp used Facebook as a data processor.
Interestingly, the ICO concluded that in the UK there was no need for consumers to take any
further actions against WhatsApp. Consequently, it did not initiate any further investigation of the
WhatsApp case in 2018. However, a new investigation in 2019 into WhatsApp has been opened
based on serious security vulnerability on the WhatsApp platform.73 The ICO announced that two
agencies dealing with the incident: the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) on behalf of the
70. Point 289 of Appendix G.
71. Point 295 of Appendix G.
72. For more information, with enclosed ICO letter and decision, see Wiredgov, A Win for the Data Protection of UK
Consumers – WhatsApp Signs Public Commitment not to Share Personal Data with Facebook Until Data Protection
Concerns are Addressed, (2018), www.wired-gov.net/wg/news.nsf/articles/Aþwinþforþtheþdataþprotectionþofþ
UKþconsumersþ%E2%80%93þWhatsAppþsignsþpublicþcommitmentþnotþtoþshareþpersonalþdataþwithþ
Facebookþuntilþdataþprotectionþconcernsþareþaddressedþ15032018112000?open.
73. For more information, see ICO, Your Data Matters Blog, https://ico.org.uk/your-data-matters/your-data-matters-blog/.
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UK consumers and the Irish Data Protection Commission (IDPC) as the lead authority for What-
sApp under the GDPR. Although the new investigation relates to the GDPR, the most obvious
conclusion to emerge from a recent investigation into WhatsApp is a combination of the consumer
and data protection law in the UK. Since the investigation is not over, there is no conclusion as to
whether there are breaches of consumer protection law.
2. Facebook case
Just as in WhatsApp case, the ICO was the authority in the UK that opened the investigation
against Facebook.74 The ICO has placed Facebook’s behaviour as an indirect influence on political
choice and found it to be priority in the protection of democracy through data protection law
instead of consumer protection. The activities of the ICO might be understood as a logical con-
sequence, considering that the ICO launched the investigation about the use of personal data
analytics solely for political purposes. Consequently, the investigation examined the transparent
processing of users’ data and the micro-targeting of political adverts during the referendum for
Brexit and the 2016 American Presidential election process. Although the ICO investigation
considered criminal issues, the ICO concluded that Facebook failed to comply with the national
data protection law properly.75
In addition, this investigation in the UK became the most extensive investigation, since it
included not only Facebook but data brokers, analytics firms, academic institutions, political
parties and campaign groups. The cornerstone for the ICO investigation was the link between
Cambridge Analytica, its parent company SCL Elections Limited and Aggregate IQ, and it
involved accusations regarding the collection of data from Facebook. The ICO’s final findings
resulted in a fine for Facebook of £500,000 for lack of transparency and security issues relating to
the collection of data. Following the ICO’s investigation, the fine it issued to Facebook was the
maximum allowable under the national data protection law, which was applicable when the Cam-
bridge Analytica scandal happened.
Summarizing the ICO’s investigation, it concluded that between 2007 and 2014 Facebook
processed the personal data of users unfairly by allowing developers access to their data through
the Facebook Business Tool App without sufficiently clear and informed consent. In addition,
Facebook allowed access to personal data, although some users did not download the Facebook
Business Tool App but were simply ‘friends’ with people who downloaded it. Besides, Facebook
also failed to keep personal information secure because it was unable to make appropriate checks
on the Facebook Business Tool App while developers were using the Facebook platform. Further,
the ICO found that Facebook Business Tool App collected up to 87 million pieces of data from the
users, and at least one million were data of the UK users. According to the ICO’s findings,
Facebook Business Tool App was developed by Dr Aleksandr Kogan and his company GSR. The
reason for the scandal was the fact that the collected data were shared with other organizations,
including SCL Group, the parent company of Cambridge Analytica. The collected data involved
the political campaigning in the US. However, another problem was the fact that Facebook users
worldwide were not aware of the collection of their data from Facebook for political purposes.
Based on all findings during the investigation, the ICO decided on fines against Facebook.
74. For more information, see ICO, Investigation into Data Analytics for Political Purposes, https://ico.org.uk/action-
weve-taken/investigation-into-data-analytics-for-political-purposes/.
75. Article 4(1) and (7) of the Data Protection Act 1998.
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On 21 November 2018, Facebook filed an appeal against the ICO decision. The court of the first
instance issued a decision on 14 June 2019. The court conclusion referred to procedural fairness and
allegations of bias on the part of the ICO, and said that the ICO should be required to disclose materials
relating to its decision regarding the fine. Following this court’s decision, the ICO appealed on 2
September 2019. However, an agreement was reached between the ICO and Facebook. Consequently,
Facebook and the ICO agreed to withdraw their appeals. Moreover, Facebook decided to pay the
£500,000 fine, and each party should bear its legal costs of the proceedings. In the end, the agreement
enables Facebook to retain documents disclosed by the ICO during the appeal for other purposes.
5. Concluding remarks
The purpose of this study was to determine how national bodies in Italy, Germany and the UK solved
cases on WhatsApp and Facebook relating to personal data processing. The research showed that Italy
could be an example of the Member State which effectively applied the rules on unfair commercial
practice regarding personal data processing. While the example of Italy showed that the UCPD’s rules
are applicable, the case law in Germany showed that data protection law and competition law have a
priority over the rules on unfair commercial practice. Also, examples in the UK showed that data
protection law is the leader when it comes to personal data processing. The result of the Italian
investigation into some of the most popular online platforms highlighted the need and the challenge
of enforcing key pieces of legislation better. The supporting argument for the Italian experience is also
a growing body of literature. Considering literature, the application of the UCPD’s rules can potentially
mitigate the effects of personalization and can support the ex-post protections provided in the GDPR
by focusing on the effects on the decision-making capacity of the average consumer.
In the end, the debate regarding the economic value of personal data is wide-ranging. On one
side, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) refused to accept the qualification of
personal data as a mere economic asset or as a counter-performance to a contract. On the other
side, the EU Commission in WhatsApp and Facebook merger activities accepted that data have
relevant economic value. The view of the EU Commission provided light for Italian authority.
Consequently, the Italian authority took data as tangible goods, and as a result it applied rules on
unfair commercial practice. All in all, personal data are often sold to third parties, and de facto has
economic value. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that data-driven businesses engaging in B2C
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